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Abstract 
Finland and New Zealand are two countries with many geographic, social, demographic and 
historic similarities.  Their telecommunications markets also demonstrate many superficial 
similarities.  However, beneath the superficial performance parallels lie two markets that have 
developed under fundamentally different cultural, institutional, commercial and political 
assumptions.  By tracing the development of each market, this paper explores the effect that 
these differences have had upon shaping the markets and explaining both the observed 
similarities in market performance and the differences.   
 
The comparative analysis suggests that Finland’s industry characterised by decentralised and 
privately-owned local firms has adjusted to the more liberalised, commercially-focused and 
competitive markets in the 21st century in a more measured and evolutionary manner than has 
been observed in New Zealand, where centralised government ownership and control 
prevailed until the revolutionary joint privatisation and liberalisation occurred.  The different 
cultures, norms, values and attitudes observed in the two countries have both evolved as a 
consequence of the different market development paths taken, and in part explain many of the 
commercial differences.  Nonetheless, the most significant differences in observed market 
performance appear to arise from regulatory artefacts – in New Zealand’s case to the 
distorting influence of universal service and free local calling obligations, and in Finland’s 
case to the prevention of mobile handset bundling with subscriptions.   
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1. Introduction 
To a casual observer, Finland and New Zealand share many similar characteristics.  Both are 
countries on the periphery of their local geographic regions – Finland at the far north-eastern 
edge of Europe and New Zealand at the southern tip of the Pacific Ocean (Figure 1).  Both are 
large (by European standards), sparsely populated countries characterised by specific 
geographic features (lakes in Finland; mountains in New Zealand) that pose challenges to the 
development of key infrastructures such as telecommunications, electricity reticulation and 
transport.   Both are also dominated by a single large city of international scale (Helsinki in 
Finland; Auckland in New Zealand), but with several smaller regional centres and many local 
villages, and both rank nearly identically in their OECD urbanisation indicators.  The 
similarities extend beyond the physical and demographic to a range of social characteristics 
(Table 1).  Their small, open economies have likewise emerged from a common historical 
reliance upon primary production – notably the forestry industry and its downstream products 
(Frame, 2000).   
 
1.1 Political, Economic and Telecommunications Similarities 
The countries also share many historical political similarities.  During the nineteenth century, 
both countries were ruled from abroad by a distant monarch, albeit with a local governor-
general and a parliament with limited jurisdiction over local issues. From 1809 until gaining 
independence in 1917, Finland was governed from St Petersburg as an autonomous Grand 
Duchy of Russia, with its own senate based in Helsinki1.  Contemporaneously, New Zealand 
was subject to British rule from London, successively as a territory of New South Wales, a 
Crown Colony (1841) with a local national parliament overseeing regional provincial 
governments from 1854 (provincial governments were dissolved in 1876) and as a self-
governing Dominion from 1907.  New Zealand did not assume full independence as a 
sovereign nation until adopting the Statute of Westminster in 19472.   
 
Both countries also share a tradition as avid and early adopters of electronic communications 
technologies (Table 2), a factor that may be attributable to the disadvantages of distance 
providing a greater spur to develop channels via which to communicate with the wider world 
(Poot, 2002).  Telegraphy featured prominently in both countries in the nineteenth century, 
with Finland’s first telegraph office being opened in Helsinki in 18553 and New Zealand’s in 
                                                     
1 http://www.stat.fi/tup/suomi90/syyskuu_en.html?tulosta
2 http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/politics/milestones  
3 http://www2.hs.fi/english/archive/news.asp?id=20020403IE13  
7/7/2008 -3- 3
Christchurch in 1862 (Wilson, 1994).  Telephones, first successfully deployed for voice 
transmission in the United States in 18764, were in operation by 1877 in Helsinki5 and 
Christchurch6. Over time, Finland has been at the forefront of the Nordic countries in the 
number of telephone lines per capita and the deployment of new telecommunications 
technologies (Müller, et. al., 1993).  Both countries deployed leading-edge networks early: 
fully digital networks (New Zealand in 1995 and Finland in 1996 – Howell, 2006), DSL 
technology (New Zealand June 1999; Finland May 2000 – OECD, 2005:13) and mobile 
telephony (NMT 4507 from 1982 and Radiolinja’s world-leading GSM network from 1988 in 
Finland8, and Telecom’s AMPS network in the late 1980s9), with new telecommunications 
methods being widely available across the countries, despite the challenging terrain (e.g. DSL 
connections are available to 94% of New Zealand and 95% of Finnish telecommunications 
consumers – OECD, 2007).   By 2005, uptake of both fixed and mobile telephony in the two 
countries was practically identical: New Zealand had 43.6 fixed lines per capita and 101.9 
mobile lines per capita, and Finland 43.4 and 102.7 respectively (OECD, 2007).   
 
Both countries were also at the forefront of regulatory developments during the worldwide 
wave of telecommunication market liberalisation beginning in the 1980s (Spiller & Cardilli, 
1997).  Initially each country adopted a unique, country-specific approach, but both have 
subsequently developed regulatory structures and obligations more consistent with the 
currently-prevailing European regulatory orthodoxy.  Finland’s regulatory regime has 
historically been characterised by extensive self-regulation and minimal political interference 
(Waverman & Sirel, 1997), and was perceived as extremely ‘light-handed’, even by the 
notably liberal Nordic standards (Müller, et., al., 1993). This approach led it into conflict with 
the European Union, whose membership requirements mandated an industry-specific 
regulatory approach to which Finland has subsequently acquiesced (Pursiainen, 2003).  New 
Zealand’s variant of ‘light-handed’ regulation stems from its world-leading reliance upon 
competition law and contractual agreements to govern the telecommunications sector when, 
in the Telecommunications Act 1987, industry-specific regulation was eschewed (Boles de 
Boer & Evans, 1996).  New Zealand, too, has adjusted its regulatory stance over the past 
seven years to one more consistent with European Union mandates, again in part in response 
to a political desire for international regulatory conformity (Howell, 2007; 2008).  
 
                                                     
4 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Telephone#Early_development  
5 http://www.stat.fi/tup/suomi90/syyskuu_en.html?tulosta  
6 http://www.referenceforbusiness.com/history2/85/Telecom-Corporation-Of-New-Zealand-Limited.html  
7 http://www.stat.fi/tup/suomi90/syyskuu_en.html?tulosta
8 http://www.elisa.com/english/index.cfm?t=6&o=6532.50  
9 http://www.referenceforbusiness.com/history2/85/Telecom-Corporation-Of-New-Zealand-Limited.html 
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1.2 The Differences 
However, the extensive superficial similarities mask crucial underlying differences.  Closer 
examination of Table 1 reveals that whilst in 2004 18.8% of New Zealand’s resident 
population was born outside of the country, only 3.3% of Finland’s population was foreign-
born.  Moreover, Finland’s population growth has been far less prolific than New Zealand’s.  
Whereas Finland’s population in 1900 was already nearly 2.7 million10, New Zealand did not 
have one million inhabitants until 1908, and passed two million only in 195211.  Together, 
these facts suggest Finland’s population has been far more stable and homogeneous (due to 
predominantly natural growth) than New Zealand’s (which has expanded from a combination 
of immigration and natural growth). 
 
There are also significant economic differences.  Finland’s GDP per capita, whilst similar to 
New Zealand’s until the mid 1990s, by 2005 was approximately 20% higher (Figure 2), due 
in large part to the Finnish economy’s greater reliance upon industry (Table 3), particularly 
the ICT sector and a much larger share of economic activity coming from trade (Table 4).  By 
contrast, using the gravity model, New Zealand is the world’s most isolated industrial 
economy and is becoming relatively more isolated over time as, unlike most OECD countries, 
the share of trade in the economy is not increasing (Evans, 2007).  Frame (2000:16) observes, 
in respect of Figure 1 and New Zealand’s relative isolation: “the radii of the circles are the 
same.  Within the circle centred on Helsinki there are 39 countries and approximately 300 
million non-Finnish people.  Within the circle centred on Wellington are Norfolk Island and a 
little of New Caledonia”.  Moreover, “if New Zealand sometimes feels that isolation is its 
defining characteristic, Finland’s has been the opposite – a surfeit of sometimes prying 
neighbours” (p15).  
 
Likewise, underlying the superficial telecommunications similarities are many other manifest 
differences.  Whilst Finland has been at the forefront of the OECD in the number of 
broadband accounts sold per capita (8th, with 27.2 per 100 at December 2006 – OECD, 2007), 
New Zealand has languished in the lower third (by comparison 21st with 14.0 per 100 at 
December 2006).  Surprisingly, the large difference in uptake cannot be attributed simply to 
poor service quality or high prices in New Zealand.  At the end of 2006, the average New 
Zealand price for a connection of 2Mbps or higher was nearly one third lower (in purchasing 
power parity terms) than the average Finnish charge (41 euro per month – Ficora, 2007:7).  
Moreover, whereas the basic New Zealand service offered to all customers in 2006 was ‘best 
                                                     
10 http://www.elisa.com/english/index.cfm?t=6&o=6532.10  
11 http://www.stats.govt.nz/products-and-services/new-zealand-in-profile-2007/history.htm  
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efforts’ on a connection with a minimum capacity of 2Mbps, only 27% of Finnish consumers 
subscribed to services of this quality or higher (Ficora, 2006).   
 
The differences extend also into the fixed and mobile markets.  Whilst Finland has been at the 
forefront of mobile telephony development, has some of the lowest prices in the OECD 
(OECD, 2007:217) and exhibits more than twice the number of call minutes per connection 
than New Zealand, in 2005 over 20% of New Zealand’s mobile connections were to leading-
edge 3G networks whereas the comparable figure for Finland was less than 2% (OECD, 
2007:98).  The low 3G purchase rate has occurred despite Finland being the first European 
country to license 3G operators (Pursiainen, 2003), a Finnish connection growth of 9% (NZ’s 
12.2%) and voice minutes per connection growing by 17.3% (NZ 4.2%) over the period 
January 2005 to December 200612.   
 
In fixed line markets, whilst New Zealand’s number of connections was relatively stable over 
the same period (a decline of 0.9%), Finland’s fell sharply (15.5%).  In addition to the decline 
in the number of fixed lines, the volume of chargeable call minutes per Finnish connection 
also fell more sharply (39.3%) than the volume per New Zealand connection (12.7%).  Whilst 
the volume of chargeable call minutes per fixed line connection in each country is broadly 
similar (Figure 4), due to New Zealand’s free local calling policy the total volume of fixed 
line traffic in New Zealand is approximately five times that of Finland13.  New Zealand’s high 
level of dial-up internet usage has been widely attributed to the absence of charging for local 
calls (Howell, 2007), but this charging approach has undoubtedly had a depressing effect 
upon the rate of substitution from dial-up to broadband internet access (Howell, 2008a).  
 
1.3 The Motivating Question and Research Methodology 
The interesting question posed by the juxtaposition of characteristics is: why, despite the very 
large number of outwardly similar characteristics, can two such countries end up with 
telecommunications markets exhibiting so many outward similarities but so many radically 
different inner differences?  Why, for example, has New Zealand developed an extensively-
utilised fixed-line voice and dial-up internet network, but failed to transfer that usage to either 
mobile or broadband networks in the manner that has been achieved in Finland?  And why, 
for example, has Finland, despite being a world leader in the development of mobile network 
                                                     
12 New Zealand data sourced from Telecom Management Commentaries and Vodafone Quarterly Reports; Finnish ones from 
Ficora (2006).    
13 Telecom Management Commentaries up to 2003 indicate that only 21% of the call volume was chargeable.  Commentaries 
beyond 2003 cease documenting the ratio of charged to chargeable minutes.   
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and handset technology, been unable to convert users from 2G to 3G technologies to the same 
extent and at an early stage in the network lifecycle as New Zealand?   
 
In this paper, we address the primary question by starting with the proposition that market 
evolution occurs as a consequence of complex interaction between a number of factors: 
namely the technologies underpinning the market, policies governing interaction, and the 
actions of the participants in the market (Figure 5; Melody, 2005).   As the interactions 
occurring are dependent upon previous actions and interactions that have occurred 
(Williamson, 1979; North, 1990), then differences in outcomes observed in the 
telecommunications markets of Finland and New Zealand in the twenty-first century likely 
have their genesis in interactions that have occurred in the past.  As the actors, institutional 
arrangements, legal rules and cultures, norms, values and attitudes (Williamson, 1998; 
Koppenjan & Groenewegen, 2005) have differed, then even though the technologies utilised 
in the two countries have been nearly identical, it is inevitable that different policies and 
market structures have developed.  These different policies and market structures may serve 
to help explain why specific similarities and differences are now observed. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows.  In sections 2 and 3, we trace the history of the New Zealand 
and Finnish regulatory markets respectively, focusing upon the interaction between policy 
and industry participant responses.  In section 4, we comment upon specific differences, and 
seek to use a comparison between the countries to find reasons why the different outcomes 
have emerged.  Section 5 concludes with some suggestions about what each of the countries 
might learn from the other to inform current and future industry development. 
 
2. New Zealand’s Telecommunication Market History 
New Zealand’s telecommunications market genesis can be traced back to its nineteenth 
century colonial origins.  Postal services in the territory were originally offered by a plethora 
of private companies, each charging their own individual rates for carrying letters and 
packages, with rates varying substantially for items carried over similar distances.  One of the 
first acts of the newly-elected colonial parliament was, in 1856, to pass legislation enabling it 
to take regulatory control and ownership of the postal sector via the establishment of the 
national Post Office (Wilson, 1994:20).  Following the very popular British ‘penny post’ 
model, the new government established a single, nationwide letter tariff, regardless of origin 
and destination.   Competition with the government provider in the carriage of letters was 
legislatively foreclosed, but competition in the carriage of packages was permitted, 
notwithstanding the fact that the Post Office offered nationally-standardised weight- and 
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distance-based rates for carriage of packages.  Legislative protection of the Post Office 
persisted until deregulation in the 1980s.  
 
2.1 Telegraphy 
Telegraphy in New Zealand was initially undertaken by a mixture of provincial government 
and British military interests.  The first telegraph lines were commissioned by the Canterbury 
Provincial Government in 1858 as a consequence of successful lobbying by local 
businessmen (notably the newspaper owners, who used their publications to rally popular 
support), but the link between Lyttleton and Christchurch did not begin operation until 1862 
(Wilson, 1994: 28-28).  The second was commissioned in 1860 by British military forces in 
Auckland province in anticipation of an attack by Waikato Maori.  Following the defeat of the 
Waikato Kingite movement, the military asked the colonial central government to take over 
ownership and operation of the economically profitable line.  The sale was transacted in 1866 
at a price of £2,276 (Wilson, 1994: 29-30).   Beginning in 1863, subsequent lines were 
deployed in conjunction with provincial government railway developments14– in many cases 
preceding the actual railway construction as improved communications improved the ability 
to co-ordinate construction processes as well as being an essential component of the 
subsequent railway operations.  Ultimately, many local railway stations became three-purpose 
depots, co-ordinating railway activities as well as acting as public post and telegraph offices.  
 
The introduction of telegraphy was thus driven by specific commercial and strategic 
imperatives.  However, from the outset a core element of the business case was the supply of 
messaging services to the general public. Government Post Office officials were quick to 
recognise the competition that telegraphy posed for their mail services, and in 1864 
legislation was passed granting the Post Office full regulatory control of telegraphs.  The 
political motivations cited were the desire to facilitate development of a nationwide telegraph 
system15 and to encourage settlement in New Zealand’s interior16.  The office of 
Superintendent of Telegraphs was established under the Post Office umbrella, operating first 
in Christchurch and subsequently in Wellington.  Consistent with the approach taken with 
postal services, one of the first regulatory actions undertaken was to mandate a single 
consistent national tariff schedule binding all operators, independent of their ownership form 
(Wilson, 1994:28).   
 
                                                     
14 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rail_transport_in_New_Zealand#Provincial_beginnings  
15 Postmaster-General, in the Department’s Annual Report 1863 (Wilson, 1994:26).  
16 Wilson (1994:22) notes an intention of the Local Posts Act 1856 was to “establish a system commensurate with the rapid 
increase of population nationwide … and to encourage and facilitate settlement of the interior”.  
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When provincial government was disestablished in 1876, all provincial railway and telegraph 
assets reverted to central government control.  The railway and telegraph assets were 
separated, with the railway ones being placed firstly in the Public Works Department and 
subsequently in 1880 the New Zealand Railways Department17 and the telegraph assets 
transferred to the Post Office under the control of the Superintendent of Telegraphs (Wilson, 
1994:28).  The Post Office thus became the monopoly owner and regulator of all postal and 
telegraph assets and service provision in New Zealand from 1876.  The position of 
Superintendent of Telegraphs consequently rose substantially in status and importance within 
the Post Office.  Wilson (1994) observes that the increased status and influence conferred was 
not lost on the incumbent at the time – Mr Charles Lemon – who proceeded to use his 
position to influence the development of industry strategy in a manner consistent with his 
own personal preferences and the relative advantage of the Post Office within the wider 
government context.   
 
2.2 Telephony 
 Following the patenting of the telephone by Alexander Graham Bell in in 1876, New 
Zealand’s first telephone connection was laid in 1877, linking Kaiapoi and Addington.  A 
year later, the first commercial service, privately owned, began in Christchurch18.  About the 
same time, an approach was made by the owner of the Melbourne Telephone Exchange to the 
Post Office to build an exchange in Wellington.  Reputedly in response to this approach, the 
Superintendent prompted the Commissioner of Telegraphs to put a Bill before parliament 
precluding anyone other than the government from operating a telephone service in New 
Zealand without the permission of the Governor in Council.  The relevant amendment to the 
Electric Telegraphs Act was passed and came into force in 1880 (Wilson, 1994:63).  The 
arrangements conferred an effective government monopoly in both the connection and calling 
markets.  
 
2.2.1 Investment 
From 1880 until deregulation in 1987, the Post Office controlled all telephony investment and 
industry strategy.  Government funding was sought via the normal political processes, whilst 
any private investment was also subject to Post Office and political sanction, as it had to be 
approved by the Governor, and such approvals could only be given if put to the governor by 
political agents on the basis of administrative recommendation.  Initially, telephony was seen 
by the Post Office as a ‘luxury’ item.  Early government investment was prioritised for 
                                                     
17 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rail_transport_in_New_Zealand#Provincial_beginnings  
18 http://www.referenceforbusiness.com/history2/85/Telecom-Corporation-Of-New-Zealand-Limited.html
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administrative and commercial purposes, and was therefore concentrated in central business 
districts and government-intensive locations Wilson, 1994:66).  Although the vast majority of 
the population lived in rural areas and the economy was underpinned by primary production, 
“the state met the demands of rural telephony only when called upon to do so through the 
contract and petition system” (Wilson, 1994:71).   
 
The contract and petition system established by the 1880 amendment required individuals 
wishing to pay for the installation of connections and exchanges themselves to put a case to 
the Post Office which would, if approved, be sent to the Governor for permission to be 
granted.  Successful petitioners covered all the capital, installation and operating costs, but the 
equipment had to be procured, installed and operated by Post Office staff.   All such ‘petition’ 
installations were subject to covenants specifying high sureties covering potential losses 
incurred by the government on procurement and installation, and that ownership of equipment 
would revert to the government in the event of any default in operating payments due to the 
Post Office.  From 1899, in order to reduce the number of petitions received, only petitions 
made by a group of not fewer than six ‘reputable’ individuals were considered.  Local 
authorities were expressly prevented from facilitating either the petitioning process or the 
installation of equipment until the passing of the Country Telephones Act in 1912. This Act 
granted local authorities permission to use ratepayer funds to supply wires and connect 
residents to Post Office exchanges.   
 
By the 1920s, all connections and exchanges installed under the petition system had 
effectively reverted to government ownership (Wilson, 1994:70), typically under the terms of 
the covenants, or voluntary (uncompensated) surrender.  As the individuals funding the initial 
connections had no ability to influence the operation of the assets they had funded, there was 
little benefit from maintaining any ongoing interest in the assets.  However, the expectation 
that rural users and property developers would self-fund the laying of expensive connections 
to remote or new locations has continued, even under private sector ownership.  Post Office, 
and subsequently Telecom, investment has been prioritised towards the provision of exchange 
and cabinet equipment, even though individuals continue to pay for the laying and 
maintenance of lines connecting their premises into the network, except where specified 
otherwise in line rental agreements.   
 
2.2.2 Tariffs 
The pattern of identical nationwide tariffs established for government-provided post and 
telegraph services was extended to government-provided telephones.  Whilst initially based 
upon a complex set of factors including the length of the wire to the exchange, the duration of 
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subscription and the order of connection to new rather than existing exchanges, line rental 
charges were simplified and standardised to a single tariff in 1883 (initially £12 per annum for 
the first year and £10 per annum thereafter, but by 1891 these had reduced to £6 and £5 per 
annum respectively).   
 
From the very beginning, charging for calls between subscribers to the same exchange was 
eschewed.  The Superintendent was not in favour of such charging as he considered it too 
“complex and onerous for exchange staff who would have to log the calls” (Wilson, 1994:66).  
Once the practice of ‘free local calling’ had become established, it was too politically difficult 
for the government-owned provider to alter the practice.  Rather, as technology improved, 
allowing exchanges to expand, ‘free local calling’ areas increased in line with the growing 
exchange catchments.  Ultimately, the establishment of ‘free local calling’ zone boundaries 
was decoupled from technological considerations, becoming determined solely by political 
fiat.   
 
As the Post Office was the monopoly provider of all of connections, local and long distance 
calling, the books were able to be balanced by recovering losses on local calling and line 
rental subsidies from long distance and international revenues.  Indeed, political support for 
increasing long distance charges was frequently garnered by trading off the increases with an 
increase in the size of ‘free local calling’ areas.  As long as increased revenues at least 
covered revenues foregone, such a strategy was fiscally neutral.  Whilst inevitably the trade-
offs must have at times had negative consequences, the lack of transparency in Post Office 
accounts made it difficult to ascertain the full extent of subsidy occurring, either within the 
telephony system itself, or from other sources such as Post Office postal or banking services 
or even the government funding vote (Wilson, 1994:151-3).   
 
2.3 New Zealand Industry Culture, Norms Values and Attitudes 
The patterns of government ownership, investment and tariff setting prevailed largely 
unchanged through most of the twentieth century.  Commercial considerations were suborned 
to bureaucratic, administrative and political processes.  Technological strategy was 
determined by a small number of senior managers within the Post Office.  Investment was 
subject to these managers being able to elicit financial support from The Treasury and 
politicians, amidst a host of other calls on the government purse strings and political 
priorities.  The small size of New Zealand and the political imperatives resulted in an episodic 
investment pattern that typically saw the entire network upgraded as a consequence of a 
single political decision, rather than incremental changes across time as a consequence of 
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changes in the financial, commercial and technical environment.  This investment pattern 
resulted in substantial technological standardisation (e.g. McTigue (1995) comments that 
even in the early 1980s, only one handset model in two colours was available) but a very 
‘lumpy’ investment pattern.  The last such ‘lumpy’ investment under government ownership 
was the decision taken in 1985 to fully digitalise the network (completed in 1995, when the 
firm was in private hands).  Current plans announced by Telecom in 2007 to roll out a “Next 
Generation” fibre-based network in all exchanges serving 300 or more lines by 2012 
reinforces the continuation of lumpy investment patterns.   
 
Nonetheless, under government ownership, politicians utilised their position to affect the 
distribution of investment and activities in a manner that suited their own electoral purposes.  
Following the 1930s depression, the Post Office (along with other government services such 
as Railways and Public Works) increasingly became a means via which welfare benefits were 
distributed: for example discounted line rental charges for specific groups (e.g. the elderly), 
provision of more apprenticeships than the organisation could reasonably require to meet its 
future needs and employment of more staff than necessary to deliver services efficiently as an 
alternative to paying unemployment benefits.  Customers, with no commercial power to alter 
industry outcomes, were restricted to political lobbying to effect any changes.   
 
The consequence of such interactions was a culture of complete politicisation of the 
telecommunications sector.  In terms of Figure 5, technologies could affect the New Zealand 
market structure only inasmuch as policy could be changed to reflect their presence.  
Likewise, customers could only affect their individual outcomes by influencing policies.  In 
terms of the Williamson/Koppenjan, & Groenewegen model, as government controlled both 
the policy and service delivery aspects of the market, in the absence of a clear separation of 
regulatory and service delivery powers, control of the sector rested with those making and 
enforcing the legal rules.  They determined the identity of the actors, the shape of the 
institutions, and thereby influenced the evolution of the sector’s cultures, norms, values and 
attitudes.   
 
The cultures, norms values and attitudes thus came to reflect an industry with a single, strong, 
powerful political provider making all rules and decisions, and dispensing all services and 
benefits.  The provider’s position could be altered by comparatively powerless individual and 
institutional actors only by penitential pleading or the replacement of the incumbent power-
holder/rule-makers by a coalition of alternative power-holder/rule-makers, who would act 
differently, but still wield the same power.  The prevailing industry culture was one of 
centralised power and adversarial conflict.  But whilst politicians came and went, senior Post 
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Office officials entrenched in the same political processes were more permanent features.  
Given their long tenures, and public choice theory suggesting that such individuals will likely 
act in a manner that reinforces their own position, it is not surprising that the cultures, norms, 
values and attitudes associated with Post Office power established in the early days of the 
postal service in the 1850s and reinforced by Lemon’s monopolising of the telephony 
networks for the government remained largely intact in the latter quarter of the 20th century.   
 
2.4 Market Liberalisation 
New Zealand’s market liberalisation began in 1984 with the election of the fourth Labour 
Government.  Contrary to previous regimes and expectations of public choice theory, the new 
government embarked upon “one of the most notable episodes of liberalization that history 
has to offer” (Henderson, 1995 cited in Evans, Grimes, Wilkinson & Teece, 1996: 1856) 
when it enacted economy-wide reforms based upon “stable, credible and mutually consistent 
macroeconomic policies which would assist in the efficient allocation of resources” and a 
microeconomic policy “achieving, wherever possible, a competitive environment in which 
markets can operate relatively free from subsequent intervention by government” (p 1863).   
 
2.4.1 Corporatisation and Privatisation 
As part of the reform process, the Post Office postal, banking and telecommunications 
services were separated into distinct, independent operational units.  Telecommunications 
policy was separated from operational functions.  Given the small size of the New Zealand 
economy, and the high costs of industry-specific regulation, generic competition law was 
favoured as the main restraint upon firms with a dominant position (MoC/Treasury, 1995).  
The Commerce Act, with a provision for price-setting in the case of dominant firms if this 
was seen as necessary (Section IV), was passed in 1986.  The Telecommunications Act 1987 
removed all statutory protections from competition that the government had enjoyed since the 
passing of the Electric Telegraph Act amendments in 1880, but created a range of reporting, 
disclosure and other regulatory obligations on firms that would be overseen by the Ministry of 
Commerce (later the Ministry of Economic Development).   
 
The Telecommunications Corporation of New Zealand (Telecom) was established as a fully 
commercial stand-alone State-Owned Enterprise facing full competition on 1 April 1989.  The 
sole additional regulatory instruments imposed were disclosure of discounts offered in excess 
of 10% of listed prices and a requirement to furnish specific information regularly to the 
Ministry of Commerce.   
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Telecom was sold in its entirety to private interests for $4.25 billion on 12 September 1990 
(since listing in 1991, Telecom has comprised between 21% and 25% of the total 
capitalisation of the New Zealand stock exchange19).  In addition to the reporting obligations, 
the sale entailed the creation of a ‘Kiwi Share’ binding the private owners to cap residential 
line rentals, thereby preventing them from rising above the Consumer Price Index-adjusted 
level at the time of sale (the ‘price cap’ obligation), to ensure that rural residential line rentals 
would not exceed urban rentals (the ‘universal service’ obligation) and to continue to offer a 
residential tariff with no local calling charges (the ‘free local calling’ obligation) (Boles de 
Boer & Evans, 1996).  Thus, whilst ownership and locus of regulatory responsibility changed, 
the two regulatory pillars prevailing since 1880 – ‘universal service’ and ‘free local calling’ – 
persisted, albeit in contractual rather than legislative form, and still underpinned by  
politically-motivated social distribution imperatives.   
 
2.4.2 Competitive Entry 
Competitive entry emerged rapidly.  Clear Communications (subsequently merged with 
Telstra-Saturn to form TelstraClear) entered the long distance market in 1991, and by 1996 
had achieved a 20% market share in national long distance and 25% in international calling 
(McTigue, 1998:36).  Many other long distance providers have subsequently entered.  
BellSouth (subsequently sold to Vodafone) began services on its GSM mobile network in 
1992, competing with Telecom’s mobile AMPS service (subsequently replaced with TDMA 
and CDMA networks) provided since 1987.  CityLink began providing Ethernet LAN 
services in Wellington in 1995, iHug offered nationwide satellite broadband services from 
1998 and Saturn entered the cable television, broadband and telephone markets in Kapiti 
(subsequently entered  in Wellington and Christchurch) in 1999 (Howell, 2003).  Despite 
widespread entry, Telecom remained the dominant fixed line provider (over 95% in 2003), 
but struggled to gain a share greater than 50% in the dial-up ISP market (Howell, 2003).   
Whilst Telecom was initially the market share leader in mobile services, Vodafone passed 
Telecom in May 2003 and since has maintained a small lead.  However, it has not exceeded 
its peak share of 57% in 2006 (Howell, 2007:64).   
 
2.5 The Road to Re-Regulation and Government Control 
Although sector ownership and the regulatory regime had instantaneously and irrevocably 
changed with the 1987-90 reforms, Telecom’s position as the dominant participant in the 
sector, and the culture, norms, values and attitudes in which it operated, changed very little, 
                                                     
19 Telecom is also listed on the Australian and New York exchanges.   
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and if at all, very slowly.  Whilst there is scant evidence of the firm having exerted its 
dominant position (none of the Section 36 court cases brought have ultimately found such 
actions have occurred), most industry participants interacted with the firm as though it was, 
like the old Post Office, actively wielding monopoly power.  Interactions were thus largely 
adversarial and confrontational, rather than based upon commercial negotiation and co-
operation.   Virtually every strategic action taken by Telecom was popularly presumed to be 
deliberately anti-competitive.  For example, when Telecom reduced local line rentals only in 
those areas where it faced infrastructure competition (a rational competitive action), it faced 
media accusations of predatory pricing.  Similar accusations emerged when the 
Telecommunications Commission arrived at an internationally benchmarked price of $27.78 
for unbundled bitstream lines, compared to the firm’s entry level broadband price of $29.95, 
which had prevailed for at least two years prior to the bitstream service being mandated, and 
which was consistent with the long-term entry level prices of firms selling broadband 
connections on competing technologies (Howell, 2007).   
 
In the absence of an industry-specific regulatory regime, claims of anti-competitive behaviour 
escalated into legal disputes that became subject to lengthy and confrontational court 
processes.  The two most prominent were the dispute was between Clear and Telecom over 
the price of local interconnection (the ‘Clear’ case), which spanned three years and three court 
hearings, and the Commerce Commission’s case brought in 1999 alleging Telecom’s 
charging 2c per minute for residential dial-up internet calls made to non-Telecom fixed line 
numbers after the first 10 hours per month was anticompetitive (the ‘0867’ case, after the 
calling prefix used), which was finally adjudicated in 2008.    
 
2.5.1 Competition and the ‘Kiwi Share’ 
At the crux of the Clear dispute was the extent to which Telecom could include in the 
interconnect price a margin to cover the additional costs of the social obligations embodied in 
the ‘Kiwi Share’20.  Whilst the Privy Council ultimately found that Telecom could 
legitimately include social costs in interconnection prices, the redistributive objective and 
political origins of the social objectives combined with the prevailing long-established 
industry culture, norms values and attitudes to make the court outcome a political issue.  
Although an inquiry by Treasury and the Ministry of Commerce in 1995 found no need to 
change the ‘light-handed’ regulatory arrangements, as the efficiency imperative was largely 
supported in the decision and industry-specific regulation was a costly alternative, a 
                                                     
20 Clear Communications v Telecom Corporation (1993) 5 TCLR 166 (HC) 25, 27, 35, 103; Clear Communications v Telecom 
Corporation (1993) 5 TCLR413 (CA) 25; Telecom Corporation v Clear Communications [1994] 5 NZBLC 103, 552 (PC); 
[1995] 1 NZLR 385 (PC) passim 
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perception prevailed that Telecom was continuing to act in the high-handed monopolist 
manner of its Post Office predecessor.   
 
The perception of anti-competitive behaviour appeared reinforced by the ‘0867’ case 
beginning in 1999.  The Ministerially-approved charge was levied in response to competitors’ 
arbitrage on an interconnect agreement that saw huge cash flows from Telecom to its 
competitors as a consequence of the rise of internet usage and the ‘free local calling’ 
obligation.  These cash flows could potentially have bankrupted the company (Howell, 2007).  
Although the action was subsequently found not to be an anti-competitive exertion of a 
dominant position21, Telecom’s competitors organised under the banner of the Telecom Users 
Association of New Zealand (TUANZ) responded with a public relations campaign and 
political pressure claiming that Telecom’s actions were unilateral, anti-competitive and 
evidence of the ‘failure’ of the ‘light-handed’ regulatory regime, as it appeared to have 
militated against rather than facilitated competitive entry sufficient to diminish Telecom’s 
dominant position.   
 
2.5.2 Political Processes Prevail 
Despite substantial fringe entry occurring (nineteen firms by 2003 – Howell, 2003), 
demonstrably lower real prices for fixed line rentals, long-distance and international calls, and 
a highly competitive ISP market with some of the highest uptake and lowest prices in the 
OECD (Howell, 2007), as a consequence of political petitioning, ‘light-handed’ regulation in 
general and Telecom’s activities in particular became key subjects of the 1999 election 
campaign.  The ultimately victorious Labour-led coalition government, as a means of 
distancing itself from its predecessor which introduced liberalisation and the subsequent 
National governments that succeeded it and maintained the liberalisation agenda, responded 
with a Ministerial Inquiry in 2000 that recommended industry-specific regulation be 
introduced22.   
 
The Telecommunications Act 2001 established the office of the Telecommunications 
Commissioner within the Commerce Commission, and gave the Commissioner the right to 
make determinations on price (using TSLRIC methodology) and non-price terms for a range 
of designated services sold by Telecom to competitors.  Notably, full local loop unbundling 
and ADSL services were not included in the first round of designated services, as the Inquiry 
had found that infrastructure-based competition would emerge, and the ‘Kiwi Share’ was 
deemed to be an industry-wide charge (renamed the Telecommunications Service Order – 
                                                     
21 1732 HRS Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Limited (NS)   
22 http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/Page____9159.aspx  
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TSO) to be levied annually by the Commissioner on all market participants.  The 
arrangements were intended to facilitate agreements only where parties were unable to agree, 
and “would still see New Zealand at very much the light-handed end of the regulatory 
spectrum, arguably the lightest within the OECD” (p 30). 
 
In practice, however, an adversarial approach presuming Telecom to be perpetually exerting 
its dominance persisted.  Rather than being, as originally intended, an arbitrator in respect of 
only a handful of disputed contracts, the Commission rapidly became the default forum for 
brokering every agreement between Telecom and its competitors (Howell, 2007).  When the 
Commission recommended in 2003 that local loop unbundling not become a regulated service 
as the benefits were small and the risks to future imminent investment by Telecom in a Next 
Generation Network (NGN) were large, the decision was greeted with dismay amongst 
Telecom’s competitors.  Their immediate response was recourse once again to political 
petitioning23. 
 
2.5.3 Repoliticising 
Political petitioning has ultimately proved more decisive for the industry than remonstrations 
to the Commission, for both regulated (or potentially regulated) firms and their competitors.  
In the 2005 election, the Labour Party manifesto proclaimed “this Labour-led government has 
ended the destructive period of ultra-light handed regulation that stifled competition, growth 
and consumer choice in ICT markets” and promised to “closely monitor and enforce 
commitments made by Telecom New Zealand under the local loop unbundling decisions and 
ensure targets for broadband uptake for the next three years as outlined in the Digital Strategy 
are met” 24.   Upon re-election, the Labour-led minority government (holding a one-seat 
majority) immediately instituted a ‘Stocktake’ of the telecommunications sector, undertaken 
not by the politically-independent Commission, but by the Ministry of Economic 
Development – a policy agency with only limited industry-specific expertise accountable 
directly to the Minister.    
 
An unscientific analysis based largely upon Telecom’s competitors’ unsubstantiated 
intentions to invest and a statistically flawed finding that competition factors (i.e. Telecom’s 
dominant market share) best explained New Zealand’s comparatively low broadband uptake 
(Howell, 2006) resulted in amendments to the Telecommunications Act mandating both full 
local loop unbundling and functional separation of Telecom’s network provision facilities 
                                                     
23 See, for example, iHug’s submission to the Minister on the matter http://www.med.govt.nz/upload/5898/tcl-rsp-to-comcom-
llu-rpt-submission040209.pdf
24 http://www.labour.org.nz/policy/jobs_and_economy/2005policy/Pol05-Comms/index.html  
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from its other operations.  Submissions were heard by politicians rather than regulatory 
personnel.  Political trading associated with the maintenance of a stable minority government 
undoubtedly influenced the Act’s passage through Parliament.  Political considerations 
consequently overruled more reasoned analysis and commercial interests.   
 
2.5.4 Return to Political Control 
By 2007, resumption of full political control of sector strategy appeared to be complete.  
Despite the Commissioner twice recommending regulation of mobile termination rates, in 
April the Ministers of Communications and Economic Development instead rejected the 
Commissioner’s recommendations and directly brokered a set of undertakings with the two 
firms concerned25.  In May, the Minister of Communications announced that he, and not the 
Commissioner, would oversee the functional separation of Telecom26.  It is noted that the 
vertically-integrated State-Owned Enterprise Kordia, via its subsidiary Orcon, is the only 
competitor to Telecom to have announced its intention to invest in every Telecom exchange 
unbundled.  Telecommunications policy is again at the forefront of the 2008 election 
campaign, with the opposition National Party pledging to invest $1.5 billion in a fibre-to-the 
home network, and the Labour-led government countering with $350 million in contestable 
broadband funding in its May 2008 budget. 
 
Whilst currently the vast majority of sector investment is privately held, New Zealand’s 
industry direction is once again in political hands.  However, unlike the vast majority of the 
sector’s history of government ownership, the current exercise of political control is 
constrained by neither a substantial public ownership interest nor the long-term strategic view 
of the industry held by previous Post Office managers.  The ability of an informed regulatory 
agency to credibly advise on policy direction also appears to have been suborned to political 
preferences.  The deep-seated New Zealand cultures, norms, values and attitudes inured to 
political control of sector strategy do not appear to have been able to adjust to the commercial 
realities of a market where ownership and control are devolved to commercial and regulatory 
actors rather than political ones.  Consequently, the default when challenges arise has been to  
political rather than commercial solutions.   
 
                                                     
25http://www.beehive.govt.nz/ViewDocument.aspx?DoumentID=28525; 
http://www.beehive.govt.nz/ViewDocument.aspx?DocumentID=29126
26 http://www.beehive.govt.nz/ViewDocument.aspx?DocumentID=29595  
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3. Finland’s Telecommunications Market History 
As with New Zealand’s, Finland’s telecommunications market has its origins in the 
nineteenth century when the country was ruled as an autonomous Grand Duchy of Russia.  
Likewise, the origins also lay in the telegraph industry. 
 
Historically, the Telegraph Office of Finland (begun in 185527) was controlled by Russian 
officials28.  When the first telephone service was installed by factory owner Johan Nissinen 
between the office and his shop on the corner of Annankatu and Eerikinkatu, Helsinki in 
December 187729, and mechanic Daniel Johannes Wadén was taking orders for telephones 
manufactured to Bell’s design from customers in Helsinki and the surrounding countryside, it 
was unclear who would take responsibility for administering the new service.    The Finnish 
Senate seized the opportunity to assert its independence by taking the fledgling industry under 
its jurisdiction and granting itself the right to issue licences to prospective operators via the 
Telephone Declaration in 1886 (Pursiainen, 2003:15).  Tsar Alexander III endorsed the 
decision30, and the modern Finnish telecommunications market was born. 
 
3.1 From Telegraph to Long-Distance State Monopoly  
The consequence of the Senate’s action was the functional separation from the industry’s very 
beginning of local connection and long-distance calling.  The Russian-owned telegraph 
service continued to provide long-distance messaging services for the public, and telegraphy 
remained the predominant means of long-distance time-dependent communication for the 
majority of the public until private telephones began to become widespread in the 1920s.  As 
in New Zealand, telegraphy service development occurred concomitantly with railway 
construction.  Upon independence in 1917, railway telegraph assets were taken over by the 
State railways and the balance by the Telegraph Office.  At this time, railway telegraph assets 
substantially exceeded those of the Telegraph Office (304 offices as opposed to 76)31.  The 
1919 Telegraph Law conferred a state monopoly on telegraph services (Pursiainen, 2003:15). 
 
In 1927, the Telegraph Office was merged with the Post Office to become the Post and 
Telegraph Office.   From 1935, when the Post and Telegraph Office bought the equipment of 
a private long distance company, long-distance calls became largely a state monopoly.  In 
1994, post and telegraph/long distance telephony were separated, with the telephony 
                                                     
27 http://www2.hs.fi/english/archive/news.asp?id=20020403IE13
28 http://www.stat.fi/tup/suomi90/syyskuu_en.html?tulosta  
29 http://www.elisa.com/english/index.cfm?t=6&o=6532.40  
30 http://www.stat.fi/tup/suomi90/syyskuu_en.html?tulosta p 1 
31 http://www.stat.fi/tup/suomi90/syyskuu_en.html?tulosta p 3 
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component becoming the 100% state-owned limited liability company Telecom Finland.  In 
1998, the name was changed to Sonera, and the firm was listed on the Helsinki and NASDAQ 
exchanges.  Sonera merged with Sweden’s Telia in 2002 to form TeliaSonera32.   
 
3.2 Dispersed Ownership of Local Connection 
By contrast, however, local telephony developed along a very different path.  The Finnish 
Senate made an early decision to pursue a devolved, localised model of telephony 
development.  From a fiscal perspective, the advantage of this approach was that all 
investment came from the private sector.  There were no state subsidies.   The by-product was 
sector development almost completely free of government involvement and hence political 
influence.   
 
Multiple licenses were granted to build and operate local exchanges (Pursiainen, 2003; 
Nattermann & Murphy, 1998), with the first beginning operations in Turku in 1881.  The 
Helsinki Telephone Association (subsequently Elisa) began operation on 6 June 1882 with 56 
subscribers33.   Whilst there was no explicit policy to do so, in practice the licences were 
granted to firms that mostly enjoyed a local geographic monopoly (e.g. a competing licence 
was granted in 1931 for Loviisa, resulting in the first operator withdrawing – Pursiainen, 
2003:37).  By 1938, there were 815 firms providing 150,000 connections (a third of which 
were managed by the Helsinki Telephone Association34), at an average size of only 180 
subscriptions.  Many small firms were operated from a local switchboard in the corner of a 
farm kitchen (Pursiainen, 2003:7).  Although substantial merging and consolidation took 
place after World War 2, in 2007 there were still 49 firms providing fixed line connections 
(Ficora, 2007).   
 
3.2.1 Growth of Co-Operative Ownership 
The Finnish Senate had no preconceived view of the ‘ideal’ or ‘preferred’ institutional form 
of the licensee firms.  Whilst some licences were granted to private for-profit firms and local 
municipal authorities, the most common institutional form that emerged was the local 
consumer-owned co-operative.  In part, this occurred because tax laws at the time favoured 
co-operative asset ownership over other private ownership forms (Pursiainen, 2003:12, 20).  
However, for a relatively homogeneous population with already-established linkages, as long 
as the membership does not become too large, co-operative ownership offers a relatively low-
                                                     
32 http://www2.hs.fi/english/archive/news.asp?id=20020403IE13  
33 http://www.elisa.com/english/index.cfm?t=6&o=6532.30
34 http://www.stat.fi/tup/suomi90/syyskuu_en.html?tulosta p 2 
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cost structure guarding against the risk of paying excessive profits to a third party as might 
occur under contractual purchase of services with natural monopoly characteristics 
(Hansmann, 1996).  As telephony consumers were also the owners, any profits gained from 
overly-high customer charges were in effect owned by those from whom they were taken, so 
there was no private gain from charging prices in excess of costs.  The main risk was that, as 
for all monopolies, in the absence of competition they were not run as efficiently as possible.  
Pursiainen (2003:20) notes that co-operative structures engendered a culture of pride in the 
local provision of services and the non-profit objectives of the firms concerned.   
 
Consumers could join their local co-operative by buying a share equivalent to one line.  
Shares were continuously available.  New share purchase furnished the capital for network 
creation and expansion.   Shares were expensive (in the order of 500 to 1000 euro at 1990 
levels), but could be traded, for example along with the sale of a property or to a prospective 
member, who could pay an additional charge to have the connection moved to another 
location.  Connections could be purchased without a share, but incurred a fixed charge of 
around 200 euro and ongoing charges of the order of 50 to 100 euro per annum higher than 
those levied on shareholders (call charges were the same for all customers).  Over time, the 
discounts offered to shareholders consistently outperformed the expected return from a long-
term investment in a bank account (Pursiainen, 2003:23) (in the order of 10% to 15% per 
annum - Nattermann & Murphy, 1998:766), making continued co-operative share ownership 
commercially viable until the emergence of mobile telephony and the internet in the late 
twentieth century.   
 
Local share ownership meant that network development tended to occur in response to 
demand and locally-specific improvements in economic conditions instead of central 
government political priorities. It also enabled network growth in times when access to 
corporate debt capital was difficult or costly to acquire.  Whilst co-operative share ownership 
risks lock-in (for example, ownership of shares that decline in value because they cannot be 
traded when there is a downturn in the local economy or the firm’s technology is superseded 
by that of a competing firm), the risk is less the more stable is the local population.  In this 
respect, Finland’s comparatively stable and homogeneous population made it a good 
candidate for co-operative development of the industry.    
 
3.2.2 Local Tariffs, Governance and Self-Regulation 
Local ownership also meant that each co-operative levied its own unique charges (both for 
shares and services) in response to its own locally-specific costs.  As the firms were fully self-
funding, with the exception of Sonera in respect of its services in the far north of the country, 
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they received no government subsidies so have not been used as vehicles of welfare 
distribution (Nattermann & Murphy, 1998:765)  Unlike New Zealand, there has never been a 
single nationwide ‘postalised’ tariff, and Finnish consumers have been inured from the very 
beginning of the industry to the fact that both connections and calls in rural areas will cost 
consumers more than in urban areas.   
 
Localised telecommunications charging is consistent with wider Finnish social policy, where 
it is treated as equivalent to other social needs such as food, clothing, accommodation and 
health care.  Consumers pay market prices, with low-income individuals receiving tax-funded 
financial support to enable them to purchase essential social goods and services from the 
private sector at the prevailing local prices.  The burden of determining who should receive 
benefits and how those benefits should be distributed is deemed too difficult and costly, and 
an inappropriate activity to be undertaken be either a private firm or a state-owned enterprise 
engaged in competitive or contestable markets (Pursiainen, 2003:38).  Whilst urban 
teledensity has historically been higher in urban than rural areas35, the differential charging 
policy does not appear to have had an undue effect upon national teledensity compared to 
other countries (Nattermann & Murphy, 1998; Müller, et. al, 1993).   
 
Locally-specific pricing has also performed an important function in the governance and 
management of the local co-operatives.  Consumers faced strong incentives to monitor prices 
in neighbouring co-operatives, and apply sanctions upon managers who failed to satisfy 
shareholders that they were performing adequately.  Dissatisfied owners also had the option 
of merging with a neighbouring co-operative if managers failed to respond to shareholder 
pressure.  Thus, the co-operatives developed a set of self-regulatory mechanisms that 
facilitated takeovers, constrained prices and ensured comparable basic minimum standards of 
service prevailed, without incurring the overhead of a stand-alone regulatory agency.  
Benchmarking against the co-operatives for both price and service quality was also used by 
consumers to assess the performance of the small number of for-profit and municipal firms 
(Pursiainen, 2003:12). Unlike New Zealand, charges have always been levied for local calls.  
Again, benchmarking could be used to assess local call price performance of the large number 
of firms. 
 
3.2.5 Mergers and Mega-Cooperatives 
Over time, technological progress resulted in the minimum efficient scale of the telephone 
firms increasing.  In addition, decentralised ownership resulted in open competition between 
                                                     
35 http://www.stat.fi/tup/suomi90/syyskuu_en.html?tulosta p 2 
7/7/2008 -22- 22
equipment manufacturers, and therefore many different technical standards.  Mergers and 
takeovers offered the opportunity to address both issues simultaneously.  Consequently, 
mergers have been a feature of the Finnish industry since its outset.  For example, state-
owned Sonera acquired its large share of the northern Finnish market via mergers and 
takeovers (Pursiainen, 2003:9) whilst the Helsinki Telephone Association (subsequently 
Elisa) grew from a combination of natural growth and acquisitions36. 
 
The emergence of the Telegraph Office (subsequently Sonera) and its expansion into the 
connection market beginning in 1917 and the growth of long-distance calling posed a 
strategic threat to the local companies.  Sonera’s business model allowed it to cross-subsidise 
connections from long-distance calling – something that the small local companies were less 
well-placed to manage.   Given the large number of small firms, and their co-operative 
ownership structure, the logical strategic response of the small firms if they wished to 
compete with Sonera but retain their independence was to federate.  The result was the 
formation of ‘mega-co-operatives’ with firms as members.  Each firm undertook its own 
operations, but co-operated with others in respect of those activities that benefited them 
jointly, such as brokering interconnection agreements, standards-setting, and creation of joint 
venture companies to carry out new business (notably long-distance (Kaukoverkko), 
international (Finnet International) and mobile (Radiolinja) calling, and data transmission 
(Datatie) services), some of which included major customers as minority partners (Pursiainen, 
2003:10).  Importantly, the mega co-operative also provided industry self-governance 
functions.  Nonetheless, the independent local ownership of the companies allowed the 
continuation of competitive rivalry that facilitated cost containment and service quality 
improvements.   
 
The first mega-co-operative formed was the Association of Telephone Companies 
(subsequently renamed Finnet in 1996) in 1921.  The Helsinki Telephone Association as the 
largest single firm took a leading role in the association.  Over time, most of the small firms 
either joined the Association or were taken over by Sonera (Pursiainen, 2003:9).  
Consequently, the industry has developed with a strong overlay of competitive tension 
between the state-owned and private sector camps.  Nattermann & Murphy (1998:759) 
identify that the Association of Telephone Companies actively lobbied against expansion of 
the state’s role in the industry, and was able to prevent planned nationalizations in 1931 and 
1948. The public/private tension is attributed by Pursiainen (2003:12) with hindering any 
possibility of cartel-like arrangements developing, and thereby fostering the evolution of a 
                                                     
36 http://www.elisa.com/english/index.cfm?t=6&o=6532.30
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remarkably competitive industry – a danger that would have existed if, for example, only 
small co-operative firms as a single mega co-operative existed.    Plurality in ownership 
structure combined with a political flavour derived from pride in independence from 
government influence has thus been a defining cultural artefact of the Finnish market. 
 
3.2.6 From Mega Co-operative to Limited Liability 
Whilst largely free of government involvement, the mega-co-operative Finnet was not 
immune to internal political forces.  Co-operatives offer advantages when they represent the 
interests of relatively homogeneous parties, but become unstable when voting interests (one 
member, one vote) do not reflect commercial interests (Hansmann, 1996).  The stability of the 
Finnet co-operative has therefore relied critically upon the alignment of the objectives of the 
larger and smaller firms (within Finnet, in the late 1990s the Helsinki co-operative 
(subsequently Elisa) had as many subscribers as all the other firms combined).  
 
The emergence of mobile telephony and the internet placed significant stresses upon the co-
operative structure.  In order to invest in the new technologies, capital injections were 
required.  Whereas fixed line telephony capital had been raised slowly over many years by 
selling new line shares, this model was not appropriate for the fast-developing mobile and 
internet markets, where it was far from clear that the necessary capital could be acquired in a 
timely manner from a very widely spread shareholder group.  Whilst debt capital may have 
been available, the higher risks associated with co-operative ownership structures deterred 
potential lenders.   
 
In respect of mobile technologies, Finnet initially addressed the capital ‘problem’ by creating 
a separate joint venture Radiolinja, where each co-operative, rather than its members, were 
the shareholders and shares were tradeable.  However, the emergence of the internet created 
further stresses, as the fixed line companies needed access to capital to enhance their existing 
network structures – a different proposition not amenable to the joint venture solution adopted 
for mobile telephony. The institutional ‘solution’ to this problem is typically to ‘demutualise’ 
and allow consolidation of existing shareholdings, or to create new capital stock that can be 
sold to a new equity partner (Hansmann, 1996).  In either case, the co-operative structure 
must be abandoned.  When significant mega co-operative members abandon the co-operative 
structure, the federation’s collaborative culture built upon homogeneity of member interests,  
objectives  and underlying structures is liable to be undermined.   
 
As the largest firm, the pressures upon Elisa to access capital to improve its networks for 
internet transmission were substantial.  In 1997, Elisa converted into a for-profit company and 
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listed on the Helsinki stock exchange.  Share ownership and the right to a line were 
unbundled, and the company began distributing dividends37.  Elisa subsequently acquired a 
significant stake in other listed companies such as Riihimäen Puhelin Oy and Heltel38, and 
took over some of the smaller co-operatives.  Whilst Elisa was changing its ownership 
structure, Finnet was engaged in negotiations to restructure its joint ventures and strengthen 
the co-operative structure.  Given the very different strategic directions being undertaken by 
Elisa and the remaining members, the mega co-operative could not continue.  In 2001, Elisa 
and its associates seceded from Finnet and formed their own federation.  Elisa subsequently 
bought out the remaining Finnet companies from major joint ventures, notably the mobile 
service provider Radiolinja. The remaining Finnet companies bought Elisa out of the national 
long distance venture (Pursiainen, 2003:10).   
 
Following Elisa’ secession, the remaining co-operatives reorganised as a new co-operative, 
also known as Finnet.  However, the co-operative has continued to be unstable.  Some firms 
subsequently seceded, to join with either Elisa or Sonera.  The two larger companies have 
also acquired independent companies formed to compete with the established players (e.g. 
Elisa acquired Saunalahti in 200539).  In 2007 a further split occurred when a number of the 
larger members took over the mobile firm DNA (formed by Finnet after the Elisa secession 
resulted in the sale of Radiolinja) and converted it into a full service provider40.  In 2008, the 
Finnet federation has reduced to 27 remaining members41, and has a very much smaller 
market share.  The 2006 and 2007 market shares of the four main provider groups are in 
Table 5.    
 
The effect of the successive mergers has been to bring about a near complete transformation 
of the Finnish industry from vertically separated network operators and long-distance 
companies each with a local monopoly but competing on benchmark performance into three 
(and potentially four) fully vertically-integrated providers competing nationwide over a range 
of products and services.   In Finland, in the absence of government direction, commercial 
imperatives have led to competition between structurally or functionally separate firms giving 
way to consolidation and competition between vertically integrated full-service 
communications firms. 
 
                                                     
37 http://www.elisa.com/english/index.cfm?t=6&o=6531.20  
38 http://www.elisa.com/english/index.cfm?t=6&o=6531.10&did=9842  
39 http://www.elisa.com/english/index.cfm?t=6&o=6531.10&did=9842
40 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dna_Finland  
41 http://www.finnet.fi/index.asp?language=1  
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3.3 From Collaborative Self-governance to Industry-Specific Regulation  
The Finnish market development has resulted in a set of industry governance arrangements as 
unique as the ownership of the firms involved.  The creation of Finnet in 1921 led to the 
organic development of a body well-suited to providing not just a self-governing regulatory 
framework, but also a mechanism via which the firms could commercially interact with each 
other.  This is well-illustrated by the development of novel interconnection agreements 
amongst the operators (Waverman & Sirel, 1997).   
 
3.3.1 ‘Peering’ and ‘Sender Keeps’ 
Rather than operators adopting end-to-end pricing to the consumer and then purchasing other 
call segments from the relevant operators via bi-lateral or regulated interconnection and call 
termination agreements as prevails in almost all other telecommunications markets, in Finland 
a ‘peering’ arrangement, where incoming traffic was handled at no charge to the originating 
operator, was adopted.  The originating firm billed the originating customer and kept all 
proceeds (Pursiainen, 2003:26).  As long as traffic between firms was approximately 
symmetric, the arrangement was relatively stable and low-cost, as it overcame the need for 
each firm to have a separate contractual agreement with each of the other up to 814 local 
firms and multiple long-distance providers (indeed, it is the charging model subsequently 
used in the emergence of the internet market, for precisely the same pragmatic desire to 
reduce contracting costs amongst a large number of providers who do not necessarily find it 
easy to enter into multiple bilateral contractual arrangements).   
 
Even with the rise of long-distance calling and the emergence of Sonera as the near-monopoly 
long-distance provider, the ‘peering’ arrangements (alternatively known as ‘sender keeps’ or 
‘bill and keep’) remained largely intact. Neither the local operators nor Sonera accepted that 
the other party should have the ability to influence the retail call price of their services.  Both 
parties therefore set their own retail prices.  The originating operator set a price that covered 
call initiation and plus a margin to reflect the costs of incoming calls handled and Sonera set 
the charge for the long-distance segment (Pursiainen, 2003: 24).  The originating operator 
invoiced all charges and settled monthly with Sonera, retaining a small (agreed) proportion of 
the Sonera charge to cover bad debts (Pursiainen, 2003: 27).   
 
3.3.2 Mobile Changes 
The growth of mobile calling, however, put the peering arrangement in jeopardy as mobile 
traffic was not well balanced (mobile was used more for outgoing than incoming calls – the 
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same tension that is now threatening peering agreements amongst internet providers as 
applications such as IPTV change internet traffic distribution patterns).   
 
In 1994, the operators agreed to a variation of the previous peering  arrangement, whereby the 
originating operator charged a local access fee covering both the originating and terminating 
segments of fixed calls and calls to mobile phones.  Standardised, nationwide termination 
charges independent of operator costs or identity were agreed for fixed and mobile calls.  
Local operators billed customers local call charges, plus the relevant long-distance fee or 
standardised incoming mobile call charge depending on the call destination. Termination 
charges were paid by the originating operators to the long-distance and mobile operators, who 
acted as acted as clearing houses, paying balances on a monthly basis to the terminating 
companies.  Like the previous arrangements, this system too was simple and self-regulatory, 
with the local call charge acting as a termination price ceiling.  Furthermore, as termination 
charges were paid from local call charges, the system maintained the principle of keeping 
local charges fully separate from long-distance charges.  In practice, termination charges were 
set at approximately half the average local call charge, as too-high a charge would have 
resulted in too little revenue for originating local operators (Pursiainen, 2003:26).   
 
3.3.3 EU Intervention 
However, the Finnish arrangements failed to meet the European Union requirements 
(developed in countries where there were only a small number of vertically-integrated 
network operators providing long distance as well as access services) requiring each network 
operator to set termination charges based upon its own specific costs, and requiring 
terminating charges to be included in long-distance charges where applicable. Meeting EU 
mandates removed the self-regulatory features of the Finnish system and imposed a layer of 
transaction costs for the firms and the regulatory body Ficora in establishing and justifying 
firm-specific charges that had not been necessary previously.  Co-operative members were 
forced to abandon collaboration over interconnection and become commercial opponents.  
The intervention also blurred the boundaries between operators and their charges.  
Interconnection tariffs and retail charges immediately increased, in some cases doubling, 
requiring even more regulatory activity (Pursiainen, 2003:27).   
 
It is debatable how much, in practice, the modified Finnish arrangements actually differed 
from the internal processes of a single firm with multiple exchanges averaging its costs across 
a large number of exchanges to arrive at a firm-specific charge for interconnection, or a 
regulator mandating a single price for interconnection to calls terminated at multiple 
exchanges each with their own unique termination costs. The EU arrangements appear to 
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penalise the Finnet companies for their federated structure without considering the benefits of 
benchmark competition that are not available in markets where a single large firm dominates.  
It cannot be discounted that the increased transaction costs imposed in meeting EU 
obligations have been a factor in the ongoing merger activity and instability within Finnet.  
However, whilst mergers will reduce costs and regulatory overheads by reducing the number 
of contracts and interconnection prices, the consequence is an effective reduction in the 
number of firms and hence the quantity of cost-related benchmarking information that has 
played such an important role in supporting the Finnish tradition of light-handed regulation 
and wherever possible industry self-governance.  
 
3.4 Government Regulation and Market Liberalisation 
Historically, Finnish government policy and regulatory activity has been more in the form of 
granting permissions and facilitating the competitive and co-operative processes that have 
emerged than restraining dominant parties and becoming directly involved in arbitrating 
disputes and determining contractual prices and terms.  Until 1994, regulatory powers lay 
with the office of Posts and Telegraphs. Following market liberalisation in 1994, in 
accordance with European Union principles, legislative and regulatory powers have been 
shared between the Ministry of Transport and Communications, which formulates policy and 
issues licences, and the stand-alone regulator Ficora, which administers industry-specific 
regulation (Pursiainen, 2003:15-16).  However, as there were already many of the hallmarks 
of a competitive industry in Finland, liberalisation has focused mostly upon removing 
competitive barriers created by existing licences, and enabling greater access to facilities 
rather than price setting.   
 
3.4.1 Liberalisation 
The most notable Finnish licence laws were the original right to issue licences in 1886, the 
Telegraph Law in 1919 conferring a monopoly in this service on the government and the 
Telecommunications Law in 1987 enabling competing licences to be granted with political 
discretion (thereby facilitating the development of a competitive mobile market – previously 
only Sonera had been able to legally offer mobile services) (Nattermann & Murphy, 1998).   
The first competing licence for GSM services was granted in 1990 (Pursiainen, 2003:20).  
Full competition in fixed line long-distance calling markets was enabled with the creation of 
Sonera in 1994.  Within months, the Finnet companies achieved a market share in excess of 
50% (Natterman & Murphy, 1998).  Two other significant pieces of legislation were the 
Telecommunications market Law 1997 which (amongst other elements) required operators to 
lease lines to their competitors (i.e. open access and LLU) and the Communications Market 
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Law in 2002 which created a technology-neutral environment by placing all communications 
services (including broadcasting, but excluding content) under the same legislative 
obligations (Pursiainen, 2003:15). 
 
The consequence of its combined co-operative and predominantly privately-owned multi-
operator background is a modern Finnish telecommunications policy that relies strongly on 
market forces rather than regulatory intervention.  Regulatory intervention is seen as a last 
resort rather than a first recourse.  In most cases, the mere creating of a power to regulate has 
been sufficient to deter undesirable actions (likely as a consequence of the relatively limited 
extent of government involvement historically).  The policy approach is underpinned by 
Finland’s own experience and that derived by observation of other countries that “politically 
acceptable alternatives may well exclude useful and competitive alternatives … Regulation 
should not prevent such development by mandating regulator-selected solutions or otherwise 
neglecting different competing solutions” (Pursiainen, 2003:33).  This approach has been 
widely attributed as a significant factor in Finland’s status as an early adopter of new 
technologies (Pursiainen, 2000), and its’ potential as a ‘test bed’ for new products and 
services that might otherwise incur regulatory attention in other jurisdictions (a status also 
enjoyed by New Zealand until recent heavy regulatory interventions were mandated).   
 
3.4.2 Ficora the “Lazy Regulator” 
A feature of the Finnish approach, most likely deriving from the co-operative days, is the 
extent to which consultation and collaboration amongst the policy-makers and industry 
participants has underpinned the development of regulations.  Quite unusually, with a few 
notable exceptions, there are no regulated tariffs..  Rather, the focus is upon providing 
information.   Tariffs must be separated into their connection, rental and usage components.  
Ficora’s role is to review the tariffs, and to intervene only if there is evidence that they 
deviate from cost-based principles. Moreover, Ficora takes no active part in negotiations 
between firms (e.g. in determining access prices). Whilst Ficora been described as a “lazy 
regulator” (Pursiainen, 2000:1) in adopting this approach, the consequence is relatively low-
cost regulation and strong incentives for the firms themselves to determine acceptable prices, 
terms and conditions in the first place.   
 
One notable exception requiring regulatory intervention was the EU requirement that 
interconnection prices be cost-based in respect of each individual fixed-line firm.  The 
mandate broke apart the industry tradition of co-operation and self-regulation, leading to price 
increases which in some cases were double the previous charges. However, rather than 
regulating individual prices, the ‘solution’ was to institute a temporary price ceiling of 60% of 
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local connection charges.  Since the expiry of the mandatory ceiling, intervention has been on 
a case-by-case basis where Ficora has not been satisfied that the charges meet cost-based 
criteria (Pursiainen, 2003:34).  Similar processes attend the assessment of charges for 
unbundled local loop access.  These firm-specific charges remain the most contentious 
element of Finnish regulation, but the presence of many firms enables Ficora to have access 
to a rich base of information to benchmark prices and thereby guide its activities, in particular 
in establishinbg the thresholds at which intervention is indicated.   
 
3.4.3 Mobile Technology, Technology Neutrality and  
A key feature of Finnish policy is its objective of technological neutrality, encompassed in the 
2002 Communications Market Law.  Wherever possible, the laws apply to all technologies 
equally.  The rapid expansion of mobile telephony has been in part attributed to this 
technology-neutral approach.  Unlike other countries, but consistent with its original policy in 
granting fixed-line telephony licences, Finland has not charged mobile operators for spectrum 
licences.  Rather, the rights have been allocated on the basis of a ‘beauty contest’ (Pursiainen, 
2000:1).   Whilst the risk existed that spectrum might not be used in a timely manner, or for 
the most productive purposes, this risk was to some extent mitigated by allocating the initial 
rights to two fiercely competitive groups – Sonera and the Finnet alliance.  Subsequent 
allocations to smaller new entrants have facilitated rapid entry by fringe players, as they do 
not face spectrum cost entry barriers.  The consequence is that Finnish mobile prices have 
been amongst the lowest in Europe.  
 
However, technology ‘neutrality’ has not always been successful.  In part to enable handset 
manufacturer Nokia to maintain its own profit margins and branding on handsets, until 2005 
mobile network operators were precluded from bundling handset purchase with monthly 
account subscriptions (the other leading handset technology country South Korea has also 
used such rules – Kim, Byun & Park, 2005).  The consequence was a comparatively old 
handset stock and slow migration to new 3G technologies (Tallberg, et. al, 2007).  With the 
removal of the bundling ban in 2005, the average handset age decreased substantially, and the 
diffusion and usage of 3G accounts has accelerated (Kivi, 2007).   
 
3.5 Finnish Industry Culture, Norms, Values and Attitudes 
As in New Zealand the Finnish industry had developed a set of cultures norms values and 
attitudes from its own unique historic origins, based around the pursuit of simplicity, 
commercial interaction, and co-operation between firms.  This is reflected in its history of 
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self-regulation, and the desire to proceed with a very ‘light-handed’ approach to government-
managed regulation. 
 
However, this culture is not immutable, and poses some threats to the success of the Finnish 
industry.  The usurpation of industry rule-making by EU mandates (evidenced in respect of 
interconnection) was likely as large a disruption to the Finnish industry as the liberalisation 
and privatisation of Telecom in New Zealand.  The new arrangements pitted firms who had 
previously operated as peers against each other as rivals, in a manner to which they had not 
previously been accustomed.  The role of long-distance operators as clearing houses was also 
undermined, as they now had to broker separate agreements with each of the local operators, 
and the trust that had previously existed could no longer be relied upon.   
 
Fear was expressed initially that inevitably, commercial disputes would escalate into costly 
and litigious courtroom battles as has occurred in other EU regimes (Pursiainen, 2003:27) and 
in t the New Zealand experience.  Nearly a decade on, however, these fears do not appear to 
have materialised.  Rather, the response appears to have been characteristically and 
pragmatically Finnish.  Although the formal rules may have changed, the ap[proach of the 
Finnish individuals, institutions (including regulatory bodies and Finnish rule-makers), 
cultures, norms, values and attitudes appear essentially unchanged..  The industry still appears 
to be characterised by the same principles of decentralised, industry-based decision-making, 
characterised by commercial interaction and co-operation where necessary in order to 
advance mutual agendas.  Decentralised control and minimal government intervention has 
resulted in an industry whose strategy is driven predominantly by industry participants.  
Changes that have occurred have been incremental rather than revolutionary, and despite 
pressure to conform to European Union conventions, still bear the hallmarks of industry-wide 
co-operation to minimise the impact of ‘prying neighbours’ on Finnish ways.   The Finnish 
industry continues to be able to adapt rapidly and innovatively to technological changes, 
albeit with the requirement that the regulators must account to the EU on elements of 
performance and adherence to EU directives.  Whilst the risk exists that welfare-enhancing 
regulation may not be undertaken rapidly, in an era where technology is changing rapidly, on 
balance the sentiment is that the light-handed approach most likely results in gains from 
innovation exceeding potential losses from absence of regulation.  
 
4. Comparing Finland and New Zealand 
The two industry histories offer case studies of two diametrically opposed industry 
approaches leading to the development of diametrically opposed cultures, norms values and 
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attitudes which in large part appear to have prevailed despite attempts over the past two 
decades to impose new sets of rules and institutional structures on established industry actors.  
Even when those rules and structures are relatively homogeneous in their nature, the 
responses in each country have been very different from each other, as the industry 
participants embodying the cultures, norms, values and attitudes that have shaped the industry 
in the past are the same ones charged with interacting under the new rules and structures and 
shaping the industry’s future.   
 
4.1 Different Histories Lead to Different Cultures 
New Zealand’s strongly centrally- and government-controlled industry deriving from colonial 
heritage and postal legislation imported from England echoes industry development in much 
of the rest of the world.  This development stands in sharp contrast to Finland’s decentralised 
industry where government’s active participation was localised both geographically and with 
respect to market segments.  A key difference appears to lie in the different approaches to 
property rights.  Whereas both in rural New Zealand and most of Finland individuals seeking 
connection to the infrastructure paid for the assets, in Finland those who invested the capital 
retained a designated share in the ensuing business, whilst in New Zealand governance of the 
assets was subsumed into the wider political processes.  The different assignment of these 
property rights appears to have had a significant part to play in the development of Finland’s 
commercial culture and New Zealand’s political one.  Individual property rights engender a 
far greater sense of local ownership and participation in governance and self-regulation than 
communal rights (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992; Hansmann, 1996; Megginso & Netter, 2002).  
Finnish consumers owned their own shares and could act individually and collectively in a 
commercial manner with respect to their ownership interests.  By contrast, New Zealand 
consumers were subject to both a collective ownership ‘tragedy of the commons’ and the 
dilution of their telecommunications interests amongst all other government activities.  
Deprived of a commercial means of interaction, the only recourse for New Zealanders was 
political. 
 
In short, the prevailing forces in the development of the Finnish industry have been those of 
technological and market development, whereas New Zealand’s has been dominated largely 
by policies.  The Finnish industry’s participants’ longer experience and greater familiarity 
with private ownership and commercial principles governing sector interaction has resulted in 
a pattern of incremental changes driven by technological and commercial imperatives and 
building on and consolidating the prevailing commercial culture.  This is in contrast to 
revolutionary changes in the New Zealand industry, which have resulted in perennial recourse 
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to the prevailing culture of political intervention.   Whereas  Finnish liberalisation was largely 
comprised of the government exiting its historic ownership interests and refining an already 
light-handed regulatory framework governing industry participants with a history of over one 
hundred years of commercial interaction, the New Zealand industry was simultaneously 
privatised and liberalised into an environment where market participants had been 
conditioned to political interaction and lacked commercial experience.    
 
The original intentions of the designers of New Zealand’s regulatory regime were to create a 
light-handed environment that, as in the Finnish case, gave primacy to commercial 
interaction, and saw regulatory intervention as a last resort.  Whilst the legislation and 
institutions specified such an environment (levels 2 and 3 of the Koppenjan & Groenewegen 
(2005) framework), their incompatibility with the prevailing cultures, norms, attitudes and 
values (level 1) of the existing participants (level 4) resulted in tensions that ultimately 
resulted in substantial politically-motivated changes to the level 2 and 3 laws and institutions.  
By contrast, rather than being ‘designed’, the Finnish industry has evolved to its present 
structures, leading to gradual adjustment of the factors at all four levels of Koppenjan & 
Groenewegen’s (2005) framework.  However, it has not been immune to externally-imposed 
changes – notably the obligations to adopt EU-mandated rules and institutional interactions at 
levels 2 and 3 – that have challenged the nature of industry interaction.  Nonetheless, the 
history of constant and continual adaptation of the industry to commercially-induced change 
has meant that the Finnish industry has been more prepared to respond at the commercial 
rather than the political level to the challenges of EU regulatory harmony – for example, by 
further reorganising of the Finnet co-operative and the use by Ficora of contractual tools and 
processes rather than explicit price-setting and other ex ante regulations to moderate industry 
interaction.      
 
4.2 Different Histories Explain Different Market Performances 
The different industry histories thus explain in large part the different responses seen at the 
commercial and regulatory levels in Finland and New Zealand.  But the question remains as 
to how these different paths may explain differences in some of the key performance 
indicators identified in Section 1. 
 
4.2.1 New Zealand’s Low Mobile Usage and Broadband Uptake 
New Zealand’s low broadband uptake compared to Finland appears to be best explained by 
the historic patterns of universal service pricing of residential line rentals and free local 
calling.  These key elements of the New Zealand regulatory environment have been 
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unchallenged since their implementation in the nineteenth century, and even in a privatised 
and liberalised environment, they have been too politically difficult to change (although a 
review is currently underway).  Free local calling is responsible for PSTN traffic in New 
Zealand being five times that in Finland, simply because callers do not face the marginal cost 
of their usage (as any call with marginal value in excess of zero will be made, whereas in 
Finland only calls with marginal value in excess of the call charge will be made).  However, 
the costs of calling must be recouped from other services – notably fixed line connection 
charges, which must be higher than if a per-call charge is levied.  New Zealanders thus pay 
higher line rentals than Finns.  Moreover, universal service charging means that urban 
consumers subsidise rural ones, and that the subsidy is bigger in the presence of free local 
calling. 
 
As fixed line and mobile calling are close (but not perfect) substitutes, the presence of a non-
charged fixed line voice call option in New Zealand must inevitably affect the volume of 
voice calling on the mobile networks.  Hence, free local calling in large part would explain 
New Zealand’s lower mobile call volumes.  Even if mobile prices were identical, the lower-
cost partial substitute would mean fewer mobile call minutes in New Zealand.  The difference 
is further exacerbated by higher call charges in New Zealand.   
 
Universal service prices have also affected the rate of substitution from fixed line to mobile 
connections.  In rural areas, the subsidy for fixed line rentals likely lowers the price to 
consumers below the cost of a mobile connection, thereby slowing the diffusion of rural 
mobile connections.  Conversely, it may accelerate the rate of substitution in urban areas if 
the fixed line price is above mobile connection costs.  However, in New Zealand, the bundle 
of both line rental and calling must be balanced in determining the optimal point of 
substitution from fixed to mobile.  As the number of connections in both Finland and New 
Zealand is similar, it is difficult to assess the relative effect of the ‘Kiwi Share’ obligations on 
subscription numbers.   
 
The relative uptake of broadband connections, however, is critically affected by both the free 
local calling and universal service obligations.  As dial-up internet is a partial substitute for 
broadband, universal service subsidies affect the timing and location of investment in 
broadband infrastructure.  Subsidies lower the price at which a user will purchase alternative 
broadband infrastructures – if the new technology has lower cost than telephony, but is higher 
than the subsidised price, investment that would be more efficient does not occur in rural 
areas.  Conversely if urban users pay a price above cost, entry may be induced by new 
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technologies that are less efficient than the incumbent’s.  In Finland, these problems are 
avoided as fixed line services are priced according to local costs.  
 
Howell (2008a) illustrates that for existing dial-up internet users, free local calling results in a 
much later substitution to broadband than when the user pays the marginal cost of dial-up 
internet calls.  Likewise, the greater the size of the line rental connection, the greater the 
benefit that must be achieved from internet use to justify the substitution from dial-up to 
broadband, as the extent of the ‘connection gift’ must be overcome.  Higher fixed line charges 
(as occurs when universal service prices are embedded in line rentals) will lead to later 
substitution than in the case where there is no subsidy.  Thus Finland, with locally-specific 
line rentals and charges for local calls would have experienced earlier substitution to 
broadband than New Zealand, despite the fact that New Zealand has a larger proportion of the 
population using the internet.   
 
4.2.2 3G Mobile Handset Uptake 
Although fixed line telephony has been subject to industry-specific regulation in New 
Zealand, mobile telephony, which emerged and developed principally in the period of ‘light-
handed regulation and once Telecom had been privatised, has been largely free of political 
intervention (except in respect of sale and purchase of spectrum and the recent Ministerially-
brokered termination agreement).  Handset bundling (i.e. discounting the price of a handset 
and recouping the cost from subscription and calling charges, from the customer in question 
or even from calling revenues charged to other high-using customers) has been a feature of 
the New Zealand industry, in part because with two networks using different technologies, 
customer switching between networks induces additional costs in that a new handset must be 
purchased.  By lowering the up-front cost of a handset, operators are able to lower explicit 
switching costs and increase switching behaviour.  The same bundling strategy can be used to 
lower the up-front costs to users switching between different technology generations (e.g. 
when Telecom switched from TDMA to CDMA, or from 2G to 3G).   
 
The key to successful bundling relies upon an internal welfare ‘subsidy’ between a product 
that the user values highly (e.g. calling) and one that is valued less highly (e.g. a handset with 
features not required, or when the existing handset is still functioning perfectly).  In these 
cases, the user may purchase a handset in a bundle when one would not be purchased if 
offered separately at cost, because the surplus gained from calling ‘subsidises’ a notional loss 
of value  from purchasing the handset.  As it is generally agreed that demand for handsets is 
more elastic than demand for calling (ref), bundling handsets and calling packages will induce 
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greater numbers of handsets to be purchased than when selling each separately at cost 
(Carlton & Perloff, 2004).   
 
New Zealand’s high uptake of 3G handsets is most likely because of aggressive and highly 
targeted bundling behaviour in the market.  Finland’s lower uptake when handset bundling 
was prohibited, and the reduction in age of the handset stock when bundling was allowed, is 
consistent with the findings of low customer valuation of the handset relative to the value of 
calling and the predictions of the value of bundling in the wide diffusion of a new technology.   
 
5. The Lessons 
In conclusion, can be learned from the comparison to inform each country?  The first lesson 
from Finland is that neither a single firm nor industry-specific regulation is imperative in the 
construction of new local public good networks.  Co-operative ownership, with 
shareholdings, provides a viable alternative that engenders both consumer participation in 
governance and industry self-regulation and standards-setting, and the emergence of 
benchmark competition.  The second Finnish lesson is that competition is antithetic to the 
principle of universal service pricing.  Local prices must reflect local costs if efficient 
competition is to emerge.  For example, operators of new, cheaper technologies can make 
local entry decisions based upon real not subsidised prices, bringing forward the time when 
inefficient incumbents can be ousted.  Whilst the obvious example is the replacement of fixed 
line telephony by mobile in parts of modern Finland, the use of a competing licence to 
remove an incumbent in Loviisa in 1931 is also instructional.   The third lesson from Finland 
is that a light-handed approach to regulation is feasible, but that it requires a consistent 
underlying industry culture of co-operation and trust to operate effectively.  This includes 
very selective use by government of its regulatory powers in order to maintain the underlying 
culture of trust and co-operation, and the primacy of commercial interaction.   
 
The main strategic lessons from New Zealand are that judicious bundling can accelerate the 
diffusion of new technologies – as evidenced by handset bundling – but that universal service 
and ‘all you can eat’ usage packages can delay the substitution from a legacy technology to a 
new one – as evidenced by the Kiwi Share distortions in the fixed line market.  On an 
institutional level, the New Zealand example compared to the Finnish one reveals that it takes 
more than simply changing the rules and ownership of the institutions to develop a 
competitive market.  Unless the rules and institutions are consistent with the norms, cultures 
values and attitudes of the actors involved, revolutionary change may lead simply to more 
revolutionary change, that is not necessarily consistent with the original objectives.  Where a 
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more measured approach is taken over time, and institutions, rules and actors can evolve 
alongside the industry, and cultures, norms, values and attitudes can adapt consistent with the 
evolutionary developments.  The latter lesson stands as an insight for all countries attempting 
to adopt regulatory harmony by imposing a standard set of rules and institutions.  As the 
Finnish and New Zealand comparison shows, unless the other elements are consistent, the 
result may be less rather than more harmony.   
 
 
 
7/7/2008 -37- 37
References 
Boles de Boer, D., & Evans, L., (1996). The economic efficiency of telecommunications in a 
deregulated market: the case of New Zealand.  Economic Record, 72(216) pp 24-39.   
Carlton, D., & Perloff, J., (2005). Modern industrial organization (4th ed.). Boston: 
Pearson/Addison Wesley.  
Evans, L., (2007), Reporting the economy: background to sustainability.  Presentation given 
to the Journalists’ Training Organisation Course, March 7, 2007.  Available on 
http://www.iscr.org.nz/f287,7689/7689_le_070307.pdf .  
Evans, L., Grimes, A., Wilkinson, B., & Teece, D., (1996), Economic reforms in New 
Zealand 1984-1995: the pursuit of efficiency. Journal of Economic Literature 34 
(December 1996), 1856-1902.  
Ficora, (2007), Market analysis of the market for wholesale broadband access. Paper 
1384/935/2006, 19.3.2007.  Helsinki, Finland: FICORA.  
Ficora, (2006), Market Review, Quarter 4 2006.  Helsinki, Finland: FICORA.   
Frame, D., (2000), Finland and New Zealand: a cross-country comparison of economic 
performance.  Working Paper 00/1, The Treasury, Wellington, New Zealand.  Available 
on http://www.treasury.govt.nz/publications/research-policy/wp/2000/00-01 .  
Hansmann, H., (1996), The ownership of enterprise.  Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press 
of Harvard University Press.   
Howell, B., (2008), The end or the means? The pursuit of competition in regulated 
telecommunications markets.  Paper presented at the International Telecommunications 
Society !7th Biennial Conference, Montreal, Canada, June 24-27, 2008. 
Howell, B., (2008a), Regulated retail tariff structures, dial-up substitution and broadband 
diffusion: learning from New Zealand’s experience.  Paper presented at the European 
Association of Researchers in Industrial Economics conference, Toulouse, France, 
September 4-6, 2008.  Available on  
http://www.iscr.org.nz/f402,11192/11192_reg_ret_tar_BH_180308.pdf  
Howell, B., (2007)  A pendulous progression: New Zealand’s telecommunications regulation 
1987-2007.  Wellington, New Zealand: New Zealand Institute for the Study of 
Competition and Regulation.  Available on  
http://www.iscr.org.nz/f378,10548/10548_Pendulous_Progress_v_4_12_Nov.pdf  
Howell, B., (2006), Submission: Telecommunications Amendment Bill.  Available from 
http://www.iscr.org.nz. 
Howell, B., (2003), Building best practice broadband: bringing infrastructure supply and 
demand together.  Wellington, New Zealand: New Zealand Institute for the Study of 
Competition and Regulation.  Available on  
http://www.iscr.org.nz/f213,4379/4379_building_best_practice_060603.pdf  
Kim, H., Byun, S., & Park., M., (2004), Mobile handset subsidy policy in Korea: historical 
analysis and evaluation, Telecommunications Policy, 28: 23-42.  
Kivi, A., (2007), Mobile Data Adoption in Finland 2005-2006.  paper presented at the 6th 
Conference on Telecommunication Techno-Economics (CTTE 2007), 14-15 June, 2007, 
Helsinki, Finland. 
Koppenjan, J., & Groenewegen, J., (2005).  Institutional design for complex technological 
systems.  International Journal on Technology, Policy and Management, 2005, Fall, pp. 
11-34. 
McTigue, M. 1998. Alternative to regulation: a study of reform in New Zealand.  Regulation 
21(1), 34-40.  
Megginson,, & Netter, J., (2001),   From state to market: a survey of empirical studies on 
privatisation.  Journal of Economic Literature 39(2):321-389. 
Melody, W., (2005), Regulation and network investment: a framework for analysis. Chapter 1 
in Mahan, A., & Melody, W. (eds) Stimulating Investment in Network Development: 
Roles for Regulators pp 19-38. Lyngby, Denmark: WDR Project, LIRNE.NET.   
7/7/2008 -38- 38
Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J. (1992). Economics, organization and management.  Englewood 
Cliffs, New Jersey:  Prentice-Hall.   
Ministry of Commerce & The Treasury. (1995). Regulation of access to vertically-integrated 
natural monopolies.  Wellington, New Zealand: Ministry of Commerce; The 
Treasury.http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/MultipageDocumentPage____4560.aspx  
Müller, J., Bohlin, E., Karpakka, J., Riis, C., & Skouby, K-E., (1993), Telecommunications 
liberalization in the Nordic countries, Telecommunications Policy 17(8), pp 623-30.  
Nattermann, P., & Murphy, D., The Finnish telecommunications market: advantage of local 
access incumbency.  Telecommunications Policy 22(9), pp 757-73.  
North, D., (1990), Institutions, institutional change and economic performance.  Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press.   
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (2007).  Communications 
Outlook 2007.  Paris: OECD.  Available on http://www.oecd.org . 
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (2006).  Information Technology 
Outlook 2006.  Paris: OECD.  Available on http://www.oecd.org . 
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (2005).  Communications 
Outlook 2005.  Paris: OECD.  Available on http://www.oecd.org . 
Poot, J., (2004), On the edge in the global economy.  Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, 
Mass.: Elgar.   
Pursiainen, H., (2003), Finnish telecom policy.  Helsinki, Finland: Ministry of Transport and 
Communications Finland.  Available on http://www.xn--viestintministeri-
xqb56a.fi/oliver/upl750-Finnish%20Telecom%20Policy.pdf  
Pursiainen, H., (2000), The ‘Lazy Regulator’ helps Finland’s telecommunications boom.  
European Affairs 1(3), Summer 2000.  
Spiller, P., & Cardilli, C., (1997). The frontier of telecommunications deregulation: small 
countries leading the pack. Journal of Economic Perspectives 11(4), 127-38.  
Tallberg,M.; Hämmäinen, H.; Töyli, J.: Kamppari, S. & and Kivi, A.  (2007). Impacts of 
handset bundling on mobile data usage: the case of Finland, Telecommunications Policy, 
vol. 31, pp. 648-659, 2007  
Waverman, L., & Sirel, E., (1997), European telecommunications markets on the verge of full 
liberalization.  Journal of Economic Perspectives 11(4), pp 113-26.  
Williamson, O., (1998), Transaction cost economics: how it works, where is it headed.  De 
Economist 146(1) pp 23-58.   
Williamson, O., (1979), Transaction cost economics: the governance of contractual relations.  
Journal of Law and Economics 22 October, pp 3-61.   
Wilson, A., (1994), Wire and wireless: a history of telecommunications in New Zealand, 
1860-1987.  Palmerston North, New Zealand: Dunmore Press.   
 
7/7/2008 -39- 39
Figure 1. Relative Geography 
 
 
Source: Frame (2000:16-17) 
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Figure 2. Comparative GDP Per Capita 
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Figure 3. Mobile Connection Consumption 
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Source: Ficora (2006); Telecom Management Commentaries; Vodafone Quarterly Reports 
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Figure 4. Fixed Line Consumption  
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Source: Ficora (2006); Telecom Management Commentaries;  
Figure 5.  Telecommunications Sector Interaction 
 
Source: Melody (2005:9) 
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Table 1. Geographic, Demographic and Social Statistics 
 
 FINLAND NZ 
Population (million) 5.2 4.1 
Land Area (sq km) 338,145 270,050 
Population Density per sq km 16 15 
Urbanisation     
   Share in 10% of regions with largest popns 34 37 
   Variation in regional density (no. by sq km) 195.18 237.15 
         max 197.08 238.47 
         min 1.89 1.31 
  OECD urbanisation indicator 43 41 
Life expectancy at birth 2004 78.8 79.2 
   males 75.3 77 
   females 82.3 81.3 
Population Growth 1950-1990 (times) 1.27 1.92 
Foreign-born population %  (2004) 3.3 18.8 
Average unemployment % 1995-2005 10.7 5.6 
Road fatalities per million vehicles 2005 133.5 133.7 
Road fatalities per million population 2005 72 99 
Prison population per 100,000 population 66 168 
Municipal waste kg per capita 2003 450 400 
Source: Statistics New Zealand; Statistics Finland and OECD Factbook 
 
Table 2. ICT Uptake 
 
OECD Ranks FINLAND NZ 
Internet hosts per 1000 (2000)  
Internet users per 100 (2005) (ITU) 
2 
19 
7 
1 
Secure servers per 1,000,000 (2000)  
Secure Servers per 1000 (2006) 
References to secure servers per 100 (2005) 
10 
13 
4 
4 
4 
5 
Source: Howell (2003); OECD (2007) 
 
 
Table 3. Comparison of Industry Sectors 
 
Industrial Characteristics FINLAND NZ 
Percentage of total value added (2002)   
   Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing 3.3 7.0 
   Industry (including energy) 27.3 19.3 
   Construction 5.2 4.6 
   Transport, hotels, restaurants 22.6 23.1 
   Banks, insurance, real estate 20.4 28.1 
   Business, government & personal services 21.2 17.9 
Source: Statistics New Zealand and Statistics Finland 
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Table 4. Trade and ICT Statistics 
 
 FINLAND NZ 
Share of trade in GDP ( % 2005) 39 29.1 
Share of ICT Manufacturing in value-added % (2003) 22.2 1.5 
ICT share of fixed capital formation % (2002) 26.6 19.6 
Exports of ICT equipment ($US millions 2004) 11,128 462 
Share telecoms in business value-added % (2003) 4.7  
Share other ICT in business value-added % (2003) 6.5  
Source: OECD (2005; 2006) 
 
Table 5. Finnish Market Shares 
 31-12-06 30-9-07 
Fixed Line Subscriptions 
    Elisa 
    Sonera 
    Finnet group 
          DNA 
    Other 
1,920,000 
32% 
30% 
33% 
 
5% 
1,750,000 
33% 
29% 
18% 
16% 
4% 
Mobile Subscriptions 
    Elisa 
    Sonera 
    Finnet group 
          DNA 
    Other 
5,670,000 
38% 
43% 
 
17% 
2% 
5,960,000 
39% 
40% 
 
20% 
1% 
Broadband Subscriptions 
    Elisa 
    Sonera 
    Finnet group 
          DNA 
    Other 
1,428,000 
34% 
29% 
25% 
 
12% 
1,570,000 
33% 
29% 
15% 
12% 
11% 
Source: Ficora (2006) and Finnet  
http://www.finnet.fi/showattachment.asp?ID=338&DocID=296  
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